

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D C 20301

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

4 AUG 1979
OS REGISTRY
***FILE** *Committees 17A*
Also Security IC

Dear Stan:

(S) Following receipt of your letter of June 29th, I ordered an immediate investigation within the DoD of the serious compromise of classified codeword information in the article by Richard Burt in the New York Times of June 29, 1979, headlined "U.S. Plans New Way to Check Soviet Missile Tests."

25X1



(U) Our inquiry also has established that information concerning the use of a site in Norway had been disclosed two months earlier in a Washington Star article by Henry S. Bradsher, 18 April 1979, titled "Listening Post in Taiwan Helps Offset Loss of Iran Sites."

(S) Persons contacted in the course of our inquiry have analyzed the 29 June 1979 N.Y. Times article by Richard Burt and have concluded that BURT received his information verbally and did not have direct access to the IIM or other SALT II monitoring documents. Their conclusion is based on several inaccurate and erroneous statements that appeared in the article.

OSD review complete. RIF w/secondary referral to DOS

- 1/ Richard Burt, N.Y. Times, 30 Mar 79, "US Plans New Arms Monitoring"
- Richard Burt, N.Y. Times, 3 Apr 79, "US May Use Modified U-2 Plane to Monitor Soviet Missile Testing"



SECRET

03555
03-9-1715/1

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(U) Our investigation to date has not established that anyone within Defense disclosed the data in question to BURT, nor has it established to the contrary that the leak occurred outside the Department. It has confirmed, however, that BURT has numerous contacts with senior officials in Defense, State, ACDA, the NSC, and in the Legislative Branch, many of whom had access to the information in question.

(S) Our investigation within Defense, which includes interviews with all key officials with access to the data in question, is almost completed. Detailed results of our internal inquiry will be available for review by other agencies and by the FBI should it launch the investigation we both have urged. We understand that similar intensive inquiries are ongoing in CIA, State, and with State's help, within the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. State, CIA and Defense are sharing their findings to date, but our inquiry, of necessity, must remain an internal DoD investigation.

Sincerely,

Harold Brown

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

O/Sec

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	DD/RM				
4	DD/NFA				
5	DD/CT				
6	DD/A	X			
7	DD/O				
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC		X		
10	LC	X			
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	O/Sec				
19					
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE DATE: 13 July

Remarks:

To: Please prepare DCI acknowledgement to include brief recital of action taken by DCI.

25X1

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Approved For Release 2008/08/05 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100140004-7

Executive Secy
11-1668

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 408, 97TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 9, 1979

OS REGISTRY

*FILE *Committees 17A*
Also: *Security 16*

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TP Q#8958

Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Stan:

The enclosed article was brought to my attention during the Congressional recess. The only thing that I can say is that this type of unauthorized leaking is totally outrageous and must be stopped. The only way this is ever going to be stopped is to find out who did this and then prosecute that person to the fullest extent of the law. If the perpetrators of this leaking are allowed to escape any punishment, the cumulative affect will be worse than all of the criticism which has been aimed at the Intelligence Community by Congress and others.

Certainly, our committee is ready and willing to help you in any way that we can in this regard. I hope that you will keep us informed as this case progresses since it is one of the most flagrant violations that I have ever seen.

With best wishes,


Barry Goldwater
Vice Chairman

Enclosure

OS 9 1715

NYT 6/29/79

U.S. Plans New Way to Check Soviet Missile Tests

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 28 — The Carter Administration, concerned that Turkey might not allow U-2 reconnaissance planes over its territory, is preparing an alternative plan for verifying the new strategic arms treaty with Moscow, officials here said today.

The plan, they said, calls for several improvements to existing methods for monitoring Soviet missile tests, including the upgrading of an electronic listening post in Norway and the use of a satellite that is now programmed to collect other information.

Although the officials acknowledged that the use of specially designed U-2R planes flying over Turkey offered the best substitute for listening stations lost in Iran early this year, they asserted that the alternative improvements to other intelligence systems would enable the Administration to insure that Moscow did not exceed restrictions on missile modernization contained in the arms treaty.

A New Satellite by 1983

They said that as early as 1983, the United States would possess a new satellite that could monitor almost all the missile test data formerly obtained by the monitoring sites in Iran.

State Department officials pointed to a statement yesterday by the Turkish Foreign Ministry indicating that the U-2 might still be permitted to fly over the country. Although a ranking Turkish Army officer said earlier this week that the flights could not be permitted "under

present circumstances," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said the Government had not reached a final decision.

Despite this, critics of the arms accord on Capitol Hill maintained that, with or without the surveillance flights, the United States could not verify restrictions against increases in size and payload of existing missiles.

Big Soviet Explosion Detected

The verification controversy heated up this week with reports that the Soviet Union conducted an underground nuclear test last Saturday that might have exceeded limits laid down in an accord Moscow signed in 1974 with Washington.

The accord put a ceiling of 150 kilotons on the size of such nuclear explosions. Some American experts believe that the latest Soviet test might have been twice that size. One kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT.

Although it is unclear whether the Soviet test exceeded the 150 kiloton limit, officials said the Administration has asked Moscow to explain the possible infraction.

Meanwhile, officials said that plans were under way at the Central Intelligence Agency and in the Pentagon to collect missile test data previously obtained by the stations in Iran by using a satellite, code-named Chalet, and a large radio intercept antenna in Norway.

Signals Can Be Intercepted

They said both the satellite and the ground station in Norway could be adjusted to pick up some of the radio signals broadcast by Soviet missiles

during flight tests. The telemetry signals provide data on missile performance characteristics and are thus considered vital to verifying the treaty provisions concerning modernization of weapons.

Earlier, officials said, the possibility of building a monitoring station in Pakistan similar to those lost in Iran, had been considered by the Administration. The proposal was turned down after informal contacts with Pakistani authorities indicated that it would not be accepted.

A proposal for using high-altitude rockets launched from ships in the Indian Ocean to monitor missile test signals was also dismissed as technically unfeasible, they said.

Critics See Holes in Detection

Congressional critics of the proposal to rely on the Norwegian station and satellites for verification contended that these systems would only be able to pick up a small fraction of the missile telemetry obtained previously at the Iranian sites. They said that a major function of the Iran stations had been to collect missile data transmitted during the first 60 seconds of a test launch and that this data could not be collected from Norway or from existing systems in space.

Pentagon officials said that for Moscow to build a new missile undetected, it would have to shield 20 or so test launches from American surveillance systems for more than a year. They contended that modest improvements to existing reconnaissance capabilities ruled out the possibility of a large-scale covert program of this sort.



Washington, D.C. 20505

OLC RECORD COPY

18 JUL 1979

OS REGISTRY

FILE *Committee 12/79**Also Security*

167

Honorable Barry Goldwater, Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

The growing number of unauthorized leaks, often of the most extraordinarily sensitive information, is one of the most disturbing and damaging problems facing the Intelligence Community today. I am as shocked and outraged as you that among those privileged to receive classified information, there are some willing to abuse the trust placed in them and to betray our country by revealing such information to unauthorized persons.

The leak about which you wrote me is one of the most serious I have seen. Immediately after its appearance, I ordered an extensive investigation throughout the Intelligence Community, using all the resources at my command, to identify those responsible. In addition, I asked Attorney General Bell for the assistance of the FBI to broaden the scope of this investigation. I now understand that such support will be forthcoming. I regret to have to inform you that the classified correspondence in this case which I sent to the Department of Justice and others has also been leaked. The Department of Justice and this Agency are also investigating this additional leak.

I greatly appreciate your expression of Committee support in this endeavor and the personal commitment you expressed to me on Thursday, 12 July, to seek appropriate punishment for those responsible. Be assured that this investigation is being conducted as thoroughly and rapidly as possible and that I will inform you and your Committee promptly of the outcome.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

25X1

ALL PORTIONS OF THIS
LETTER ARE CLASSIFIED
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

D/Sec

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
	1	DCI			
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Executive Registry
140004-7 38

United States Senate

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(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 104, 97TH CONGRESS)

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July 9, 1979

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FILE

Committees 17A
Also: Security 16

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
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The Director



Washington, D.C. 20505

OLC 79-2016/A

79-1608/A

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18 JUL 1979

OS REGISTRY

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Also: Security 16

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
Yours sincerely,

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

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OS 01715/A

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Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied

US REGISTRY
*** FILE** Comm. Hees 17A
also: Personnel 221
Kampiles
also: Ref Library 11

Office of Legislative Counsel

19 June 1979

TO:
✓ Bob Gambino, D/Sec

The attached was transmitted to Earl Eisenhower, Minority Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on 19 June. It is being transmitted to you for such action as you deem appropriate and required in order to inform others in the Executive Branch on the particulars of the information provided to Committee staff concerning the "prior" investigation".

Attachment

25X1

OS 9 1572

Page Denied

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		<small>DATE</small> 19 June 1979
TO: Director of Security		
<small>ROOM NO.</small> 4E60	<small>BUILDING</small> Hqs.	
<small>REMARKS:</small> Info copy.		
FROM: OLC		
<small>ROOM NO.</small> 6D15	<small>BUILDING</small> Hqs.	

OS REGISTRY

FILE *Comm. Sec. 171*

*Also, Bureau Lib
Kampiles
Also, H.S. Library 11*

CONSIDERED CONFIDENTIAL WITH ATTACHMENT

Office of Legislative Counsel

13 June 1979

NOTE FOR THE FILE

25X1 [redacted] was advised that the
attached information, at a minimum, would
25X1 be considered classified at the CONFIDENTIAL
level. [redacted] indicated that he would
take some unspecified action with respect
to this matter. I told him that I thought
it was important that we be made aware of
the entirety of the material in question
or be provided whatever other information he
could supply concerning possible source since
we had a legitimate and appropriate interest
in stopping or preventing such disclosures.
He was noncommittal.

25X1 [redacted]

Attachment

25X1 cc: [redacted]

Bob Gambino, D/Sec

CONSIDERED CONFIDENTIAL WITH ATTACHMENT

05-9-1572/11

Page Denied